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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal involves two separate legal malpractice 
actions filed after the commencement of the bankruptcy 
case. The parties do not dispute that the first of the two 
actions constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate. The 
principal issue presented by this appeal is whether the 
second, successive malpractice action is also pr operty of 
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the estate. The appellant, Anne L. O'Dowd, claims that 
since the second malpractice action did not accrue until 
four years after the bankruptcy filing, it is personal 
property and does not belong to the bankruptcy estate. The 
District Court disagreed. 
 
Because O'Dowd's second malpractice action is based on 
alleged pleading errors committed in the first malpractice 
action, and it is the bankruptcy estate that was har med by 
the alleged malpractice that is the subject of the second 
action, we conclude that it constitutes an inter est in 
property acquired by the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. S 541(a)(7). Accordingly, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court. 
 




In 1990, Anne L. O'Dowd purchased an apartment 
building for approximately $1 million. Milton Sevack, a 
local attorney, represented her in the transaction. O'Dowd 
contends that, after the closing, she learned that the 
building contained structural flaws and that the seller had 
exaggerated the rental income. She claims that the 
investment "placed her in [a] direfinancial situation," 
ultimately leading to her filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
petition on March 27, 1992 in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. 
 
Thereafter, O'Dowd hired Howar d C. Trueger to represent 
her in the bankruptcy proceedings. She also r etained 
Trueger to commence a lawsuit against Sevack to recover 
damages arising from his mishandling of several matters 
including the purchase of the apartment building. In 1993, 
Trueger commenced a legal malpractice action against 
Sevack in state court, asserting claims solely with respect 
to the apartment building purchase (the "Sevack Action").1 
According to O'Dowd, Trueger omitted various other claims 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Trueger also asserted malpractice claims against individuals other 
than Sevack. For simplicity, we will refer to the entire group of 
defendants collectively as "Sevack." 
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she had against Sevack. There is no dispute that when the 
Sevack Action was filed, it became property of her 
bankruptcy estate. 
 
On August 3, 1994, the Bankruptcy Court converted 
O'Dowd's Chapter 11 reorganization pr oceeding into a 
Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, and a trustee was named 
for the estate (the "Trustee"). The Bankruptcy Court then 
discharged O'Dowd on December 23, 1994. Soon thereafter, 
because of impending ethics charges unr elated to the 
instant case, Trueger withdrew as O'Dowd's counsel. To 
replace Trueger, O'Dowd retained the law firm of Biunno, 
Commisa & Taormina, P.C.2 
 
In May 1995, the Trustee proposed to settle the Sevack 
Action for $10,000. O'Dowd formally objected to what she 
believed was a low settlement figure. In an order dated July 
24, 1995, the Bankruptcy Court denied the Trustee's 
proposed settlement and allowed O'Dowd to pr oceed with 
the Sevack Action in state court. In retur n, the Trustee was 
to be entitled to the first $10,000 of any net pr oceeds. The 
order also provided that "the balance[of any recovery] may 
be retained by the debtor, as having been abandoned" by 
the Trustee.3 After the Bankruptcy Court's decision, 
O'Dowd dismissed Biunno and retained Hilton L. Stein to 
represent her in the Sevack Action. In 1996, Stein settled 
the suit for an undisclosed amount. 
 
Shortly after the settlement, O'Dowd allegedly discovered 
that Trueger had left out a number of her claims in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The law firm of Biunno, Commisa & Taormina, P.C. includes attorneys 
David B. Biunno, Vincent D. Commisa, and Marisa A. Taormina. We will 
refer collectively to the firm and these individuals as "Biunno." 
 
3. We reject O'Dowd's contention that the malpractice lawsuit against 
Trueger and Biunno constitutes personal pr operty because all claims in 
excess of $10,000 were abandoned by the T rustee. Abandonment is an 
intentional act and nothing in the recor d supports a finding that the 
Trustee intended to abandon the omitted claims. See Hanover Ins. Co. v. 
Tyco Indus. Inc., 500 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 6007 (providing for abandonment of property by way of 
motion). Moreover, at the time of the bankruptcy order, neither the 
Trustee, nor the court, appeared to have had any idea that the 
unasserted claims existed. 
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Sevack Action, but that the claims were now time-barred 
under the applicable New Jersey statute of limitations. 
Thus, in November 1996, O'Dowd brought a second legal 
malpractice action against both Trueger and Biunno in the 
New Jersey Superior Court (the "Trueger/Biunno Action"). 
In her complaint, O'Dowd alleged that Trueger had failed to 
plead all of her potential claims against Sevack. She also 
contended that if Biunno had properly infor med her of 
Trueger's pleading mistake, she could have"purchased" the 
omitted claims from the Trustee along with the apartment 
building claims.4 O'Dowd further asserted that she settled 
the Sevack Action for substantially less than what she 
could have recovered had Trueger and Biunno properly 
raised and pled all of the claims against Sevack. 
 
Biunno filed a motion in state court to dismiss O'Dowd's 
complaint on the ground that the Trueger/Biunno Action 
constituted property of the bankruptcy estate and therefore 
O'Dowd lacked standing to prosecute the matter . The state 
court ordered O'Dowd to seek a deter mination in the 
Bankruptcy Court as to whether that malpractice action 
constituted estate property. In December 1997, O'Dowd 




On July 21, 1998, the Bankruptcy Court issued a written 
opinion concluding that the Trueger/Biunno Action 
constituted property of the bankruptcy estate. Relying on 
the Supreme Court's decision in Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 
375 (1966), the Bankruptcy Court held that the malpractice 
claims were sufficiently rooted in O'Dowd's past to be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We take O'Dowd to mean that, had she known of the pleading failure, 
she would have sought to include the omitted claims under the same 
terms ordered by the Bankruptcy Court in denying the Trustee's 
settlement proposal. As this would not have involved an acquisition of 
property for valuable consideration, O'Dowd would not have technically 
"purchased" these omitted claims fr om the Trustee. A true purchase of 
the omitted claims would have been void under the New Jersey common 
law prohibition against assigning prejudgment tort claims. See generally 
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considered property of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
S 541(a)(1). 
 
Under an alternative analysis, the court also held that 
the claims constituted property of the estate pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. S 541(a)(7), which includes "[a]ny interest in property 
that the estate acquires after the commencement of the 
case." Finally, the court held that O'Dowd was barred 
under 11 U.S.C. S 108 from bringing the T rueger/Biunno 
Action in the first instance because she had failed to 
request that the Trustee assert the malpractice claims on 
her behalf. 
 
O'Dowd appealed the Bankruptcy Court's decision to the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. 
By order entered May 19, 1999, the District Court rejected 
the Bankruptcy Court's S 541(a)(1) analysis, but upheld the 
inclusion of the Trueger/Biunno Action in the estate under 
S 541(a)(7).5 On appeal from this order, O'Dowd argues that 
the District Court incorrectly determined that the 
Trueger/Biunno Action constituted property of the estate 
under S 541(a)(7). In response, Appellees Trueger and 
Biunno argue that the lower court's deter mination should 
be upheld under both S 541(a)(1) and S 541(a)(7).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In a footnote, the District Court declined to address the merits of the 
Bankruptcy Court's ruling that the Trueger/Biunno Action was barred 
under S 108, finding that it constituted only dictum. O'Dowd challenges 
this conclusion on appeal. However, like the District Court, our 
determination that the Trueger/Biunno Action constitutes property of 
the estate pursuant to S 541(a)(7) obviates our need to address this 
issue. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Markiewicz, 930 F.2d 
262, 266 (3d Cir. 1991); accord In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 640 (7th 
Cir. 1990). 
 
6. Appellees may advance this argument even though they did not file a 
cross-appeal. See E.F. Operating Corp. v. American Bldgs., 993 F.2d 
1046, 1048 (3d Cir. 1993). However, because we conclude that the 
Trueger/Biunno Action constitutes property of the estate pursuant to 
S 541(a)(7), we find it unnecessary to addr ess Appellee's alternative 
basis 
for affirming the District Court. Accor dingly, we do not express any 
opinion as to the merits of the District Court'sS 541(a)(1) ruling, except 
to note that the Trueger/Biunno Action seeks r eimbursement for the 
mishandling of the first malpractice action, which clearly had roots in 
O'Dowd's pre-bankruptcy past. Ordinarily, the degree of the nexus 
between a suit based on pre-petition conduct and a derivative post- 
petition malpractice action will determine whether the latter constitutes 
property of the estate under S 541(a)(1). 
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The Bankruptcy Court exercised jurisdiction over this 
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 157. The District Court 
exercised jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 158. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 28 U.S.C. S 158(d). Our review of the 
District Court's decision to affirm the Bankruptcy Court's 






Under Title 11 of the United States Code (the 
"Bankruptcy Code"), the filing of a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy court commences a bankruptcy proceeding and 
creates an estate. 11 U.S.C. S 541(a). The estate: 
 
       is comprised of all the following property, wherever 
       located and by whomever held: 
 
       (1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of 
       this section, all legal or equitable interests of the 
       debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
       case. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires 
       after the commencement of the case. 
 
Accordingly, with limited exceptions (none of which apply 
here), the estate encompasses everything that the debtor 
owns upon filing a petition, as well as any derivative rights, 
such as property interests the estate acquires after the case 
commences. See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 
462 U.S. 198, 203-05 (1983) (term "estate" refers to the 
grouping of the debtor's assets which ar e subject to the 
claims of creditors). 
 
We have previously emphasized Congr ess' intent to 
delineate in broad terms what constitutes property of the 
estate. See Integrated Solutions, Inc. v. Service Support 
Specialities, Inc., 124 F.3d 487, 490-91 (3d Cir. 1997). As 
the legislative history for S 541 states,"[i]t includes all 
kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property, 
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causes of action . . . and all other forms of property 
currently specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act." 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323. The legislative purpose of this 
section was to move away from the "complicated melange of 
references to State law" and to "determine[ ] what is 
property of the estate by a simple refer ence to what 
interests in property that debtor has at the time of the 
commencement of the case." Id. at 175, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 6136 (footnotes omitted). 
 
While federal law defines what types of pr operty comprise 
the estate, state law generally determines what interest, if 
any, a debtor has in property. Congr ess Talcott Corp. v. 
Gruber, 993 F.2d 315, 319 (3d Cir . 1993) (citing Aquilino v. 
United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960)); In re Roach, 824 
F.2d 1370, 1374 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Butner v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)). As the Supr eme Court has 
instructed: 
 
       [p]roperty interests are cr eated and defined by state 
       law. Unless some federal interest requir es a different 
       result, there is no reason why such interests should be 
       analyzed differently simply because an interested party 
       is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Unifor m 
       treatment of property interests by both state and 
       federal courts within a State serves to reduce 
       uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to 
       prevent a party from receiving "a windfall merely by 
       reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy." 
 
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting 
Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Detr oit, 364 U.S. 603, 
609 (1961)). 
 
O'Dowd argues that the Trueger/Biunno Action does not 
constitute property subject to inclusion in the estate. She 
maintains that her malpractice claims did not accrue until 
1996, while the estate came into existence four years earlier 
in 1992 when she filed her petition. It was only in 1996, 
she contends, that she became aware of her for mer 
attorneys' negligence and that the omitted claims were 
time-barred under state law. Thus, accor ding to O'Dowd, all 
the legally relevant events that comprise the malpractice 
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action occurred well after the commencement of her 
bankruptcy case. Since the claim was not legally cognizable 
"as of the commencement of the case," she contends that it 
cannot constitute "property" subject to inclusion in a 
federal bankruptcy estate. She also asserts that a legal 
malpractice claim, by its very nature, can only belong to the 
debtor, and thus can be acquired only by the debtor. 
 
Against this background, we turn to New Jersey law to 
determine when the Trueger/Biunno Action accrued. We 
then address O'Dowd's argument, which implicates 11 
U.S.C. S 541(a)(7), that a legal malpractice claim can never 
become the property of a bankruptcy estate because it 




We agree with O'Dowd that, under New Jersey law, the 
Trueger/Biunno Action did not accrue until 1996. In New 
Jersey, "a legal-malpractice action accrues when an 
attorney's breach of professional duty proximately causes a 
plaintiff 's damages." Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 621 A.2d 459, 
463 (N.J. 1993); accord Olds v. Donnelly , 696 A.2d 633, 641 
(N.J. 1997). In special cases, such as malpractice actions, 
New Jersey courts have adopted the discovery rule"to 
postpone the accrual of a cause of action" when a plaintiff 
is unaware of the facts underlying a claim. Bronkesh, 621 
A.2d at 463. 
 
Accordingly, the Trueger/Biunno Action did not accrue 
until O'Dowd first learned of the omitted claims in the 
Sevack Action. Thus, any property inter est that O'Dowd 
had in the Trueger/Biunno Action did not come into 
existence until 1996, four years after she filed her 
bankruptcy petition. 
 
O'Dowd's primary contention is that, since the 
Trueger/Biunno Action is a post-petition tort claim, it can 
belong only to the debtor. She relies on caselaw in which 
courts have found that a debtor's post-petition cause of 
action did not constitute property of the estate. See, e.g., 
Bobroff v. Continental Bank, 43 B.R. 746, 750-51 (E.D. Pa. 
1984) (debtor's tort claims were not pr operty of estate 
where events giving rise to claims occurr ed following filing 
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of debtor's Chapter 7 petition), aff 'd, 766 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 
1985); Brunswick Bank & Trust Co. v. Atanasov (In re 
Atanasov), 221 B.R. 113, 116-17 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998) 
(debtor's malicious prosecution claim was not property of 
estate as it arose post-petition when indictment was 
dismissed); In re Doemling, 127 B.R. 954, 955-57 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 1991) (debtors' tort claim arising from automobile 
accident five months after filing of bankruptcy petition was 
not property of estate); Mathews v. United States (In re 
Mathews), 184 B.R. 594, 601 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1995) 
(Chapter 7 debtors' compensatory damages awar d against 
IRS was awarded to debtors personally, and not as estate 
property, where award was premised on IRS actions that 
primarily took place post-discharge). 
 
However, none of these cases involved claims that could 
be traced directly to pre-petition conduct in the way that 
the Trueger/Biunno Action can be traced to the Sevack 
Action. The injury alleged in the Trueger/Biunno Action is 
that O'Dowd suffered a diminished r ecovery in the Sevack 
Action as result of her former attor neys' negligence. Put 
differently, the misconduct of O'Dowd's former bankruptcy 
attorneys reduced the value of her malpractice lawsuit 
against Sevack. While we acknowledge that the conduct 
giving rise to the malpractice claim occurred post-petition, 
we find it conceptually impossible to sever the 
Trueger/Biunno Action from the underlying Sevack Action. 
Moreover, even though O'Dowd did not r etain Trueger and 
Biunno until after she had filed her Chapter 11 petition, 
the malpractice claims are traceable dir ectly to O'Dowd's 
pre-bankruptcy dealings with Sevack. 
 
Moreover, in the cases cited by O'Dowd, the alleged 
wrongful conduct damaged the debtor personally and had 
no effect on the estate. Indeed, the courts in these cases 
emphasized that the inquiry often depends on whether the 
estate or the debtor suffers the harm. Accordingly, only in 
the post-petition situation where the debtor is personally 
injured by the alleged malpractice, while the estate is 
concomitantly not affected, is it appr opriate to assign the 
malpractice to the debtor. See, e.g., Osborn v. Durant Bank 
& Trust Co. of Durant, Okla. (In re Osborn), No. 95-7118, 
95-7124, 95-7121, 83 F.3d 433, 1996 WL 196695, at *4-5 
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(10th Cir. Apr. 24, 1996) (table) (legal malpractice claim was 
property of debtors because it sought r ecovery for injury to 
debtors personally and not to estate). 
 
Here, any alleged malpractice resulting fr om the omission 
of claims in the Sevack Action would affect only the estate, 
not O'Dowd, because it would have reduced the value of the 
Sevack Action, which was property of the estate. In other 
words, because the Sevack Action belonged to the estate, 
including the claims that could have been but wer e not 
asserted, a malpractice suit in connection with those 
omitted claims likewise belongs to the estate and the 
estate's creditors. 
 
Finally, O'Dowd argues that the District Court should 
have performed a balancing test to deter mine whether 
O'Dowd or the estate suffered the gr eatest harm. While we 
decline to address the propriety of r esorting to such a 
balancing test, we note that since the omitted claims 
constitute estate property, O'Dowd cannot demonstrate that 
she suffered any harm as a r esult of the malpractice alleged 
in the Trueger/Biunno Action. Thus, she personally was 
not affected by any diminishment in their value, and 
consequently any balancing would weigh overwhelmingly in 
favor of the estate. 
 
O'Dowd's bankruptcy estate is the true injur ed party. It 
owned the omitted claims in the Sevack Action and, if the 
allegations in the Trueger/Biunno Action ar e true, it is the 
estate that deserves to be made whole. We therefore 
conclude that since the estate acquired the T rueger/Biunno 
Action after the commencement of the case, the lawsuit 
constitutes estate property under S 541(a)(7) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which provides that pr operty of the 
estate includes "[a]ny interest in pr operty that the estate 




For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the 
Trueger/Biunno Action constitutes property of O'Dowd's 
bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C.S 541(a)(7), and therefore 
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we will affirm the District Court. 
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